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Abstract 
Global governance actors and institutions suffer from democratic deficit. The paper has examined the three 
proposals for mitigating the democratic deficit in global governance: Global people’s Assembly (Flak and 
Strauss, 2000, 2001); Global accountability mechanisms (Grant and Keohane, 2005); and political deliberation 
(Steffek and Nanz, 2008). I have shown that the proposal for creating global representative institutions is 
premature since there are no global demos. In addition, the attempt to replicate democratic institutions and 
procedures at the level of states to the global level will be difficult to realize. I have argued that the proposal for 
political deliberation can address the problems of democratic legitimacy in global governance since it 
emphasizes normative democratic values of inclusion, participation, transparency, responsiveness and 
deliberation 
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1. Introduction 
Global governance can be understood in terms of the regulations to provide solution to specific ‘denationalized 
problems’ or providing ‘transnational common goods’. (Zürn, 2013:408) One of the challenges facing global 
governance is the ‘democratic deficit’ or lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability (Held and Koenig-
Archibugi 2005; Nayyar and Court, 2002; Steffek and Nanz, 2008; Wheatley, 2010).Democratic deficit of 
governance institutions is assessed in terms of the three notions of democratic legitimacy: input, throughput and 
output legitimacy. (Uhlin, 2010:23; Bekkers and Edwards, 2007:43).  
Input legitimacy implies the normative idea of ‘government by the people’ and is assessed in terms of 
representation and opportunities for participation (Bekkers, etal, 2007:6). Throughput legitimacy focuses on the 
processes and procedures of decision making and is assessed in terms of transparency, accountability, 
participation and deliberation (Uhlin, 2010:23). Output legitimacy represents the normative idea of ‘government 
for the people’ and is assessed in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of outcomes, responsiveness and 
accountability. (Bekkers, etal, 2007:6).Big bureaucracies and especially supranational bureaucracies suffer from 
input and throughput legitimacy (Dijkstra,2007:288) 
 Most authors agree that global governance institutions suffer from the democratic deficit (Jens and 
Steffek, 2008).Some scholars also argue that international organizations cannot be democratic (Dahl, 1999). 
These scholars note the difficulty of achieving democracy beyond the nation state precisely because there are no 
global citizens. (Dahl, 1999; Grant and keohane, 2005).However, some other writers see the possibility of 
mitigating the democratic deficit and democratically legitimizing global governance.  
This paper is an exposition and critical reflection on three proposals for mitigating the democratic 
deficit in global governance: Global Peoples Assembly (Falk and Strauss, 2000, 2001); Global accountability 
mechanisms (Grant and Keohane, 2005); and political deliberation (Steffek and Nanz, 2008). I suppose that 
global governance can be democratized and the institutionalization of deliberative practices can be significant in 
the process of democratically legitimizing global governance. Thus, the paper proceeds as follows. First, I 
present the argument for Global people’s assembly. Second, I present the argument for new global accountability 
mechanisms. Third, I present the argument for political deliberation. Fourth, I will critically reflect on the three 
proposals. In this part, I argue that the institutionalization of deliberative practices is significant in the process of 
democratizing global governance. Finally, I provide a conclusion. 
 
2.    Proposals for democratizing global Governance 
2.1. Global Peoples Assembly 
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss (2000, 2001) view the problem of global governance as the lack of 
representative democratic institutions at the global level. They argue that democratic institutions at the level of 
state can be extended to the global level (2000:191) they specifically argue that the creation of elected global 
people’s assembly (here after the GPA) is significant to overcome the problems of effective global governance 
and challenge the authority of states. (Ibid: 193)  
The argument of Falk and Strauss is based on the premise that emergent global civil society can act as 
an independent force in global politics: “Globalization has generated an emergent global civil society composed 
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of transnational business, labor, media, religious, and issue oriented citizen advocacy networks with an 
expanding independent capacity to initiate and validate a GPA.”(Ibid: 194). As a result, the GPA is not to be 
formed by a treaty among states but by the emerging global civil society 
Falk and Strauss suppose that the GPA will need support from sovereign states since states possess 
financial and logistical resources (Ibid: 204).In this regard, they take the European parliament as an ecouraging 
example in creating a global legislative institution. “In fact, the same European Union states that have promoted 
the Parliament are among the most likely to lend their support to the creation of a GPA.”(Ibid: 206).But, the 
question is that if GPA is to be initiated not by treaty among states, how can it be legitimate to make laws 
binding on governments? They argue that global policy makers will find GPA helpful to mitigate the democratic 
deficit (Ibid: 215).In addition, they suggest that the GPA can be associated with the General Assembly of the UN 
to form a bicameral world legislature (2001:220) 
 
2.2. New Global Accountability Mechanisms 
Ruth W. Grant and Robert Keohane (2005) view the problem of global governance in terms of the lack of 
accountability mechanisms to limit the abuses of power in world politics. They note that there is a rising concern 
about the use of power and abuse of power in world politics due to globalization, the exercise of authority by 
multilateral organizations and increasing number of NGOs. Indeed, accountability and democracy are the central 
issues of the controversy over globalization (2005:29).Global governance can be legitimized by improving the 
already existing accountability mechanisms to limit the abuses of power in world politics. “Yet these 
mechanisms cannot simply replicate, on a larger scale, the familiar procedures and practices of democratic 
states.”(Ibid) 
Accountability is a relational concept involving power wielders and the public. The central questions 
of a theory of accountability are: “What constitutes an abuse of power? And who is entitled to hold power-
wielders accountable?”(Ibid: 34). These questions can easily be answered in democratic nations since they have 
a well defined public. Grant and Keohane (Ibid: 34) state: 
Power is abused whenever it is used for private or partial interests contrary to the interests of the 
public. And the public is entitled to hold power-wielders accountable in a democratic nation for 
abuses of power, either as the source of that power (the delegation model) or as the body affected by it 
(the participation model) or both. 
Grant and keohane argue that the attempt to replicate democratic accountability at the state level to the 
global level is bound to fail precisely because there is no global public in both the juridical and sociological 
sense. (Ibid: 34). Hence, they consider the proposal by Falk and Strauss (2000, 2001) for the creation of global 
representative institutions ‘premature at best’. (Ibid) 
Grant and keohane argue that effective global accountability require a pragmatic approach that does 
not presuppose the existence of a global public. They argue that claims to legitimacy at the global level depend 
on inclusiveness of state participation and general norms fairness. (Ibid: 35). They identify three informal norms 
which can serve as sources of legitimacy to global power wielders: conformity to human right norms: normative 
principles democracy; normative pressure on the patterns of extreme economic inequality. (Ibid).Therefore, 
global power wielders can be made accountable even if they lack delegation. Grant and Keohane also identify 
seven accountability mechanisms that are operating in world politics on the basis of which new accountability 
mechanisms can be developed. These are: hierarchical; supervisory; fiscal; legal; market; peer; and public 
reputational. (Ibid: 36).The first four involve forms of delegation while the rest involve forms of participation 
(Ibid)  
Grant and keohane describe how these mechanisms of accountability constrain power wielders in 
world politics. They argue that supervisory, fiscal, hierarchical and reputational accountability is applicable to 
multilateral organizations. (Ibid) Peer, reputational and market accountability constrain NGOs. Firms are mostly 
constrained by market and reputational accountability. The accountability of states is dependent on their power 
in world politics. Supervisory and fiscal accountability can constrain weak and dependent states. However, 
strong states can be constrained by peer and reputational accountability. (Ibid: 40) 
 
2.3. Political Deliberation 
The third proposal to mitigate the democratic deficit in global governance emphasizes the institutionalization of 
deliberative practices. Jens Steffek and Patrizia Nanz (2008) argue for the possibility of democratic legitimation 
of global governance without a presupposition of demos (pre-political homogeneity of citizens) or national 
electoral democracies.(Steffek and Nanz,2008:5) Their argument is based on the assumption that deliberative 
understanding of  democracy is suited to European and Global governance and organized civil society 
participation is vital to democratically legitimize Global governance.(Steffek and Nanz, 2008:5-7). 
Deliberation is crucial to democracy since political debate focus on the common good. However, 
Steffek and Nanz note that deliberation is not intrinsically democratic and may not advance the interest of most 
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affected parties (Ibid: 6). In order to advance the common good, “Deliberative democracy must ensure that 
citizens’ concerns feed into the policy-making process and are taken into account when it comes to a decision on 
binding rules.”(Ibid: 6). 
The democratization of global governance requires the participation of organized civil society 
organizations in global governance institutions. Civil society organizations can serve as a ‘transmission belt’ 
between international organizations and emerging transnational public sphere. Steffek and Nanz (ibid: 8) argue: 
If organized civil society has the opportunity to participate in international governance, it may act 
as a ‘transmission belt’ between international organizations and an emerging transnational public 
sphere. This transmission belt might operate in two directions: First, civil society organizations can 
give voice to citizens’ concerns and channel them into the deliberative process of international 
organizations. Second, they can make internal decision-making processes of international 
organizations more transparent to the wider public and formulate technical issues in accessible 
terms. 
Steffek and Nanz note that there is already some empirical evidence of an emerging transnational 
discourse about the faults and merits of global governance. These include the transnational public debate over 
the international monetary institutions, the public discourse on international organizations and their policies 
which question the legitimacy of global governance. In addition, non-governmental actors are playing an 
important role in making international governance transparent and accountable by triggering public debate on 
global governance. (Ibid: 7) 
The project of Steffek and Nanz aims to assess the ‘democratic quality’ of international organizations. 
They define democratic quality as the capacity of an institution or procedure to bring about free, informed and 
inclusive deliberation. (Ibid: 9).They provide four dimensions of democratic quality: Access to deliberation; 
Transparency and access to information; Responsiveness to stakeholder concerns; Inclusion of all voices. (Ibid: 
10) 
Access to deliberation and Transparency are preconditions for democratically legitimate decision 
making (Ibid: 11). Access to deliberation requires the participation and equal influence of citizens or all those 
affected in political decision making. At the global level, the access to deliberation describes participation of 
civil society organizations in global deliberation. (Ibid: 10).Transparency and access to information demands that 
the actors in decision making should have full information about the problem, options and cost and benefits of 
various options.(Ibid) 
Steffek and Nanz note that access to deliberation and transparency will not affect the democratic 
quality of the procedure if concerns of civil society organizations are not adequately reflected in deliberation and 
hence can not affect the decisions. As such, the deliberation process requires another dimension of democratic 
quality that is responsiveness. Responsiveness requires that all political proposals should be justified in view of 
the common good and adjustment of decisions by state actors to accommodate the positions of civil society 
organizations. (Ibid: 11) 
The dimension of inclusion requires that the arguments of those affected by decisions should be 
included in the process of decision making. “Inclusion realizes the principle of political equality and is, therefore, 
a key issue that affects the democratic quality of decision making.”(Ibid: 12) 
 
3. Critical Reflection   
In the previous parts of the paper, we have seen the different proposals to overcome the democratic deficit and 
for democratically legitimizing global governance. In this part of the paper, I critically examine the proposals. I 
argue that the proposal for political deliberation by Steffek and Nanz (2008) can be a remedy to democratic 
deficit and significant in the process of democratically legitimizing global governance. 
The proposal of Falk and Strauss (2000, 2001) for creating a global parliament as a remedy for the 
democratic deficit of global governance seems ideal since it depends on the existence of global citizens. Since 
global demos do not exist at the moment, the proposal for creating Global people’s assembly is ‘premature at 
best’ (Grant and Keohane, 2005:34) 
The proposal of Grant and Keohane (2005) for improved global accountability mechanisms is 
important if we look at it from the perspective of output legitimacy. Improving accountability mechanisms can 
be significant in order to manage abuse of power by actors of global governance. It might also be useful to 
ensure efficiency and effectiveness of actors and institutions of global governance. However, the proposal is 
pragmatic and all forms of accountability are not democratic. Steffek and Nanz (2008:2) observe: 
Not all forms of accountability can qualify as democratic, however. Accountability of decision makers to 
markets … to courts … or to peers…would not necessarily enhance citizens’ influence in, and control 
over, the institutions of global and European governance 
Grant and Keohane compromise the normative ideals of input and throughput legitimacy. This is 
evident in that the four accountability mechanisms that is hierarchical, supervisory, Fiscal and Legal are 
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delegated and do not involve participation from the wider public. The neglect of the democratic content could be 
seen in their identification of the most criticized of global power wielders such as WB, IMF, UN, WTO and the 
European commission as the most accountable (Grant and Keohane,2005:37).  
Grant and Keohane do not provide uniform criteria of accountability to constrain states as actors of 
global governance. One good example is their argument that accountability of states depends on their power in 
world politics. Hence, Supervisory and fiscal accountability can constrain weak and dependent states. However, 
strong states can be constrained by peer and reputational accountability. (Ibid: 40) 
Thus, the proposal of Grant and Keohane is focused on accountability mechanisms which are not 
necessarily related to democracy. They do not also consider the emerging civil society organizations in the 
processes of democratizing global governance. I think, they do not address the democratic deficit of global 
governance. 
I argue that the proposal for political deliberation by Steffek and Nanz (2008) can address the 
problems of democratic legitimacy in global governance institutions from different angles. First, their argument 
for democratizing global governance does not presuppose global demos or replication of national democracies. 
This is important because it opens a new route in the process of democratizing global governance. 
Second, the deliberative understanding of democracy gives emphasis to inclusion, participation, 
transparency, and responsiveness. Moreover, political deliberation can be a source of democratic legitimacy 
since it can be oriented to the advancement of the common interest or the common good.  
Third, the institutionalization of civil society organizations in global governance institutions will be 
central in mitigating the democratic deficit of global governance. The legitimizing potential of civil society 
organizations is related to their role as intermediaries between global governance institutions and the public. This 
can increase the transparency and accountability of global governance institutions.  
Fourth, access to deliberation, transparency, responsiveness and inclusion are normative values to 
assess the democratic quality of global governance institutions. This is of paramount importance because it 
enables us to empirically assess the democratic quality of global governance institutions. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Global governance actors and institutions suffer from democratic deficit. The paper has examined the three 
proposals for mitigating the democratic deficit in global governance: Global people’s Assembly (Flak and 
Strauss, 2000, 2001); Global accountability mechanisms (Grant and Keohane, 2005); and political deliberation 
(Steffek and Nanz, 2008). I have shown that the proposal for creating global representative institutions is 
premature since there are no global demos. In addition, the attempt to replicate democratic institutions and 
procedures at the level of states to the global level will be difficult to realize.  
The global accountability mechanisms identified by Grant and Keohane might be important for 
managing the abuse of power by global power wielders. However, the mechanisms are focused on ensuring 
efficiency and effectiveness and all forms of accountability are not democratic. Furthermore, the approach 
compromises democratic values and do not give a place for civil society participation in the process of 
democratizing global governance. 
I have argued that the proposal for political deliberation can address the problems of democratic 
legitimacy in global governance since it emphasises normative democratic values of inclusion, participation, 
transparency, responsiveness and deliberation. The approach focuses on deliberation of those affected and give 
emphasis to the institutionalization of global civil society organizations in global governance institutions. The 
institutionalization of deliberative practices is recognition of legitimizing potential of civil society in their 
intermediary role between global governance institutions and the public. This can increase the transparency and 
accountability of global governance institutions. The approach also provides normative values to assess the 
democratic quality of global governance institutions. 
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